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LOBBYING THE LEGISLATURE IN THE REPUBLIC:
WHY LOBBY REFORM IS UNIMPORTANT
JAMES M. DEMARCO*
INTRODUCTION
"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains."1 So
begins Rousseau's The Social Contract. Rousseau's notion of the
paradox of human freedom bears significance in current Ameri-
can political discussions. Americans live in a democracy, and yet
the very meaning of the word is not being met by current polit-
ical structures. Popular sentiment, as evidenced by the 1992
Perot presidential campaign is, in Ross Perot's words, "you now
have a government that comes at you and you're supposed to
have a government that comes from you. "2
Congress, in particular the House of Representatives, has a
reputation for failing to be the collegial body wherein public
debate would determine the will of the governed. Popular senti-
ment maintains that spending by lobbying groups, aimed at cur-
rying votes for favorite projects, inflates incumbent politicians'
ability to gain reelection, and that dealings between lobbyists and
representatives subvert the public good.' Analyzing closely the
role lobbying groups play in the American political process, how-
ever, leads inevitably to the conclusion that they increase rather
than decrease the public's role in government.4 By representing
a vast array of public and private interests, lobbying groups
* B.S., 1991, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1994, Notre Dame Law
School; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1992-1994.
1. JEAN J. RoussEAu, THE SocIAL CoNTRAcr, reprinted in RoussEAu's
POLITICAL WRITINGS at 85 (Alan Ritter &Julia Conaway Bondanella eds., 1988).
2. The 1992 Campaign: Transcript of the 2d TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton
and Perot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at All.
3. Id. President Clinton agrees, and has lobbied hard for a lobbying
reform bill:
The work of change, frankly, will never get any easier until we limit the
influence of well-financed interests who profit from this current
system. So I also must now call on you to finish the job both houses
began last year by passing tough and meaningful campaign finance
reform and lobbying reform legislation this year.
State of the Union: Excerpts From President Clinton's Message on the State of the Union,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at A16.
4. In his introduction to How to Lobby Congress, Donald deKieffer, writing
on behalf of public interest lobbying groups, stresses the increasing importance
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intend to influence Congress on each major issue facing it. Lob-
bying groups exist for nearly every issue with which Congress
deals.5 A 1977 study by Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson
concluded that the amount of influence these groups can exert
over legislation depends primarily on the popular support that
each group claims to control.6 A 1989 study byJohn W. Kingdon
agrees, noting that the role of lobbyists in legislation is of only
average importance. 7 Lobbying groups usually do not counter
popular control over government; rather, they enhance such
control by representing to the legislature the various majority
and minority opinions on individual issues. The problem with
lobbying is not lobbyists, but rather a Congressional system that
creates power bases in a few select members rather than in the
entire body.
While lobbying groups are not so troublesome, there are
numerous problems in the legislative process today. Reelection
rates in Congress are staggeringly high,' creating politicians with
more job security than most businesspeople. Many bills languish
in congressional committees for years before making it to a floor
vote; many more die before getting to the Committee of the
Whole, often despite clear public mandate.9 Representatives use
of the citizen lobbyist in the American political system. DONALD DEKIEFFER, How
TO LOBBY CONGRESS at xiv (1981).
5. John B.Judis, The Pressure Elite: Inside the Narrow World of Advocacy Group
Politics, THE AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1992, at 15 (1992).
6. MALCOLM JEWELL & SAMUEL PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATWE PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1977).
7.
As compared with other possible influences on congressmen's votes,
interest groups are among neither the most important nor the least.
Congressmen appear to consider them quite important, but they do
not necessarily vote according to their wishes. This rather mixed
picture leads away from global statements about group importance
toward an emphasis on the conditions of group influence.
JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 174 (3d ed. 1989).
8. In 1992, a year of "revolt" against incumbents in Congress, the
reelection rate was still 88%. Charles E. Cook, Old Timers Beware: Another
Freshman Food Is on the Way, ROLL CALL, Dec. 13, 1993. The 1990 reelection rate
was 95%. Illustration accompanying Helen Dewar, Stalemate of Survival: Self-
Interest Defines Campaign Fund Issue, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1992, at A28. See
Charles E. Cook, Women's Groups Hoping to Preserve 1992 Momentum, ROLL CALL,
Jan. 31, 1994 (reelection rates rarely fall below "85% even in the worst of
years").
9. For example, the Brady Law, requiring a five day waiting period for the
purchase of a handgun, took several years to pass despite its overwhelming
support from the general public. Over time, Congress has developed complex
procedures for passing bills. These legislative pitfalls for a bill to surpass are
formidable no matter how important the bill seems to be: "When it goes from
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in-committee amendments and "christmas trees" to attach
locally-interested pieces of pork barrel legislation to more signifi-
cant bills in the hope that the cumbersome process of resubmit-
ting a bill will deter the President from vetoing an entire piece of
legislation. Representatives lavish certain commercial interests
with special treatment ° and form legislative policies which
clearly benefit particular constituent" interests or special inter-
est groups despite the harm such representation can have on the
public good.
The legislative quagmire Congress has established promotes
rule by the few rather than by the many. A bill enters the legisla-
tive process in the House of Representatives by floor or commit-
tee proposal from a representative. Once it is proposed to the
floor, the House Rules Committee attaches the bill to the legisla-
tive agenda. If the Rules Committee wishes the bill to receive
special treatment, it may place it on an expedited calendar by
proposing special rules of procedure. The Rules Committee can
also slow a bill down by means of the agenda. Once a bill is
scheduled, it is then assigned to the appropriate committee for
consideration and amendment. If the committee passes the bill,
it goes back to the Rules Committee, which determines whether
and when the bill will reach the floor of the House for a full
House vote. Assuming the bill passes the House and then the
Senate without veto, it becomes law. Throughout this process,
the bill is subject to examination, friendly and unfriendly amend-
ment, and outright rejection at each step. Popular opinion
believes that powerful lobbies manipulate representatives
throughout the legislative process to ensure that bills match lob-
byists' designs.
TheJewell and Patterson study tends to counter the popular
sentiment of both 1977 and today. If Jewell, Patterson and
Kingdon are correct (and public opinion wrong), then lobbying
the clerk's desk to a committee-room it crosses a parliamentary bridge of sighs
to dim dungeons of silence whence it will never return. The means and time of
its death are unknown, but its friends never see it again." WOODROW WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 69 (11th ed. 1895), reprinted in GRAHAM
WooTroN, INTEREST GROUPS: POLICY & POLITICS IN AIERICA 60 (1985).
10. Among many anecdotal examples is 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(3)(A),
which excludes milk carriers from being classified as statutory agent driver
employees for tax withholding purposes.
11. Note that the word constituent has both a functional and a
geographic definition. For members of Congress, constituent has a
geographical definition - a representative's constituents are those who live in
her or his district. For lobbying groups, constituent has a functional definition
- a lobbying group's constituents are those who share the group's viewpoint
on a given issue.
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groups actually enhance popular control over the legislature by
secondarily emphasizing popular sentiment on political issues. 2
The committee structure of the House of Representatives
enables these groups to exert influence over Congress in pre-
cisely the same way and with very similar results as more tradi-
tional influence groups. 3 As will be detailed below, the problem
with lobbying lies not necessarily with the lobbyists themselves,
but rather with a Congressional system that requires representa-
tives to specialize and to rely on public opinion for their voting
decisions. Increasing restrictions on lobbyists will prove to be an
ineffectual attempt at increasing popular accountability.
Part I of this article will place the importance of lobbying
groups within the historical context of the Constitution's
Framer's intended republican legislature and the First Amend-
ment right to petition. Part II will then analyze how lobbying
activities fit within the Constitutional right to petition, noting
their connection with the opinions of the electorate. Part III will
demonstrate that legislative stagnation in Congress stems not
from over-influential lobbying groups but rather from a hierar-
chical committee system that places more emphasis on expertise
and cooperation than on judgment and debate. Part IV will ana-
lyze current attempts at lobby reform and explain their useless-
ness. Part V will conclude this article by offering a framework for
effectual solutions to Congressional gridlock.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT - THE FEDERALIST
To understand why lobby reform will not change anything,
one must understand how Congress is supposed to work and why
the House of Representatives fails to work in its intended fash-
12. Judis, supra note 5, at 21. On the other hand, much influence in
Congress today comes from small focus groups and corporate Political Action
Committees (PACs), which represent far fewer people than most lobbying
groups. It should be noted, however, that while PACs tend to represent fewer
people they usually represent large economic interests that affect large
numbers of people.
13. ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND COURTS at x (1983).
This essay deals solely with the work of the House of Representatives for two
reasons. First, since the two houses of Congress operate differently, evaluating
what happens in one house might mean misinterpreting the work of the other.
Evaluating the way both houses operate would muddle this article's focus on
the effect of lobbying groups. Second. the way in which the House of
Representatives deals with legislation seems more problematic: "The norm of
specialization is stronger in the House than in the Senate because the Senate is
smaller and each member therefore must cover a larger portion of the
institution's business." WALTER J. STONE, REPUBLIC AT RISK: SELF-INTEREST IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 176 (1990).
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ion. When it is evident that legislative procedures within the
House counter the House's original design and thus prevent
effective popular representation, the reader will find it clear that
the policy gridlock problem is structural rather than political.
Then the reader will conclude that lobby reform fails to strike at
the heart of the problem. This section attempts to lay the foun-
dation of the Framer's intentions regarding the House of
Representatives.
The United States Constitution was written as a compromise.
Various provisions of the document reflect settlement of divisive
arguments between parties to the Constitutional Convention. 4
The Constitution's Framers hoped to create a bicameral legisla-
ture which would withstand the pressures of factionalism and
mob rule. 5 To protect against the upheaval of mob rule, they
established a governing body discreet from most outside influ-
ence. 6 The patrician government the Framers envisioned, how-
ever, was unacceptable to the Constitution's ratifiers. They
ultimately required the addition of the first ten amendments to
counter the aristocratic nature of the government and to protect
the population's rights and voice in government.' 7 The first
Congress convened under the rules of a Constitution which
hoped to balance a republican form of government with protec-
tion of citizen rights.
A. Representation Starts in the House of Representatives
To the Framers, the bicameral nature of the legislature was
to be the primary source of popular sovereignty as well as the
primary protection against factionalism. The House of Repre-
sentatives, elected directly by the people, would be the source of
all revenue and expenditure measures.'" Its members would be
the only elected officials selected directly by the voting popula-
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (three-fifths clause), § 3 (Senate
chosen by state legislatures).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 53 (James Madison) (Random House
1950). Federalist 10 defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."
Id. at 54.
16. The Constitution originally provided that the President be elected by
electors, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, ci. 2, and that the Senate be chosen by state
legislatures. Art. I, § 3, cl. I (amended 1913). Only the House of
Representatives would be open to full voter control. Art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
17. THOMAS A. BAILEY & DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT 135
(7th ed. 1983).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1
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tion, and their elections were to occur the most frequently in the
federal government. They were to be ones most responsible for
protecting citizen rights of participation against minority fac-
tions." At the same time, representatives had to avoid subjecting
themselves to the pressures of factionalism in their constituencies
and among their colleagues. The House of Representatives
would be the place where popular rule and republican govern-
ment would combine.
To the Framers, the most important part of popular sover-
eignty would be representation in the House of Representa-
tives.2 ° The House was to be that place where those most
responsible to the people (by virtue of their selection from small
groups of local constituents) would discern the consensus of the
governed." The House became an indirect way for the people
to rule themselves.
19. "As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should
have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the
branch of it under consideration [the House of Representatives] should have an
immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people." THE
FEDERALIST No. 52, at 343 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Random
House 1950).
20.
Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences ... must
necessarily be submitted to the formation of the legislature .... The
differences of opinion, and thejarrings of parties in that department
of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary
plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve
to check excesses in the majority.
The Federalist No. 70, at 454 (Alexander Hamilton) (Random House 1950).
The House was to be the place for the majority to determine the law while
checked by the forcefulness of opinions from minority viewpoints.
21. "It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought
to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But
this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests
to which the authority and care of the representative relate." THE FEDERALIST
No. 56, at 365-66 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Random House
1950). It should be noted that "the governed" to which The Federalist refers
consisted of only a fraction of the adult population. While the Bill of Rights
purported to protect those excluded from the franchise, the body of the
Constitution intended to serve only those considered worthy of the vote. For
purposes of this article, the distinction is immaterial because the legislature's
role under a republican model is to protect the rights of all citizens regardless
of franchise.
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B. Independence of Legislators Is Vital for Popular Sovereignty
Republican democracy 22 has the purpose of promoting wise,
although potentially unpopular, decisions in the favor of the
public good. To the Framers, republican representatives would
be more able to discern the will of the people than would the
people collectively themselves: "[T] he public voice, pronounced
by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to
the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves,
convened for the purpose."2 3 Representatives in the House
would not attempt consensus for the efficiency of legislation.
Rather, they would attempt to apply the will of the governed by
applying their skills and judgment in debate, and by letting the
majority vote arising from the debate stand as popular
consensus.
24
Key to this republican system was independence of legisla-
tors. Without independent viewpoints, debate would be stifled
and majority rule would be subject to coalition and consensus
among political factions. Accordingly, the Framers espoused the
view that representative democracy at its best involves strongly
independent representatives discerning what is for the collective
good.
1. Burke Theory Relies on Personal Judgment
This republican principle, very similar to Sir Edmund
Burke's theory of political representation,25 rejects the idea that
22. As opposed to pure democracy. Federalist 10 designates pure
democracy to mean government where all citizens voice their individual
choices. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 15, at 59. The same description
applies to legislatures where representatives choose the viewpoints, of their
constituents in strict proportions.
23. Id.
24. "When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an
end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable." THE FEDERALIST
No. 70, supra note 20, at 458.
25. Burke Theory, as enumerated in his speech to the Electors at Bristol,
maintains that a representative in the legislature owes his or her constituents
more than simply voting as a majority thereof would vote as individuals.
Election of a representative means selection of that person for his or her
judgment and wisdom in dealing with political issues. A representative may
vote against what is in the clear majority's opinion if that representative judges
the unpopular vote to be in the best interest of his or her constituents. If
constituents decide that the representative has exercised judgment of which
they disapprove, they may simply vote him or her out of office at the next
election. Anti-Burke theory, the competing contemporary theory of
representative government, claimed that a representative owes his or her
constituents a duty to vote precisely as a majority thereof would.
Representation requires no thought on issues where the majority is clear. If a
1994]
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representatives are nothing more than the mere voices of their
constituents' collective will. Burke theory posits that a represen-
tative offers his constituents both the chance to have their voice
heard and the wisdom and judgment of his representation. In
his speech to the Electors at Bristol, Burke said: "Your represen-
tative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opin-
ion."26 Thomas Cooper in 1826 noted that republican represen-
tation allowed representatives to take advantage of debate within
the legislature before forming political positions:
In every deliberative assembly, it is implied and expected
that no member shall make up his opinion deliberately till
after he has heard the debate on it, with all the lights that
the exhibition of authentic facts and documents, and the
various aspects of the question brought into full view dur-
ing the discussion can supply .... Every man called to the
national legislature, is a national and not a local represen-
tative. He is sent to debate, and after debate to decide on
the great interests of the nation.
2 7
If the constituents disagreed with their representative's judg-
ment, they could simply vote him out of office at the next elec-
28tion. Presumably, a legislator's reelection would be a popular
mandate of his overall wisdom and ability as a representative.
2. Anti-Burke Theory Disdains Personal Judgment
Anti-Burke theory disagrees strongly with the notion of pop-
ular mandate. According to this theory, representatives are
merely the voice of their constituents' will: "The person chosen
seems to be strictly the delegate of those by whom he is chosen,
and bound by their instructions whenever they think proper to
exercise the right."29 Reelection would mean merely that the
representative had acted as his constituents desired. Under Anti-
Burke theory, popular sovereignty demands that representatives
be mere mouthpieces for their constituents' desires:
If the maxim be true that all power is derived from the
people ... it seems impossible for us to withhold our assent
representative is voted out of office, that means the majority will of the
constituents has changed. See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
26. Speech by Edmund Burke to the Electors at Bristol, in SPEECHES AND
LETrERS ON AMERMCAN AFFAIRS 73 (E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc. 1956) (1908).
27. THOMAS COOPER, EssAY ON THE FOUNDATION OF CVL GOV'ERNMENT 34
(1826).
28. Id.
29. Id at 33 (quoting Henry St. George Tucker).
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from the proposition, that in a popular government the
representative is bound to speak the sense of his constitu-
ents, upon every subject where he is informed of it.
3 0
Consequently, once the Congressional representative became
aware of his constituents' collective views, he would be bound to
vote accordingly.
3. The Federalist Agrees with Burke Theory
Federalist 10 embraces republican theory as the operating
principle for the national legislature. James Madison believed
the House would be composed of members of many classes, rep-
resenting different factional viewpoints on issues. In any repre-
sentative government, conflicts would be resolved by a majority
vote: "If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied
by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat
its sinister views by regular vote."3 1  In a pure democracy, fac-
tions which make up a majority would be free to subject minority
rights and the public good to the oppression of a majority vote."2
Federalist 10 chooses to embrace a theory which protects against
majority factionalism. Under Federalist 10, informed representa-
tives whose goal is the public good would exercise judgment and
debate to discern what is best for the governed. 3 In his analysis
of The Federalist, David Epstein describes the difference between
pure democracy and The Federalist's Burkian republic as follows:
"The difference is that while enlightened statesmen were
expected to adjust the clashes of the partisans in the legislature,
it is now suggested that the legislative body's entire membership
can be improved, replacing partisans with men of patriotism and
wisdom." 4 Patriotic public officials would be those most likely to
protect private rights while representing the people in the
national House.3 5
30. COOPER, supra note 27, at 33.
31. THIE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 15, at 57.
32. Id.
33.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the [Burkian]
scheme of representation takes place, [serves] ... to refine and enlarge
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.
Id at 59.
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4. The Constitution Has Stronger Guarantees than Burke
Theory
The Constitution's ratifiers refused to accept that patriotism
would protect against oppression in the legislature. Protection
of private rights, while not essential to the Constitution's authors,
was crucial to its ratifiers.36 Fundamental to the protection of
these rights was the first set of rights protected: free speech and
association, and petitioning the government for a redress of
grievances. The First Amendment to the Constitution states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.""' Protection of this right to petition
results in protection of minority viewpoints by allowing those in
the minority to bring their cause to the legislature and to con-
vince representatives of the public good to be served by protect-
ing their rights.38
Protection of viewpoint means protection of rights, but it
does not require espousal of that viewpoint. To the Framers, any
minority viewpoint could be overruled by a majority, while the
members of that majority could be voted out of office at the next
election.39 In the House, patriotic representatives using judg-
ment and the honing focus of debate would determine the will of
the governed and protect against mob mentalities while discern-
ing what was best for the public good.
The Framers envisioned this republican legislature to be,
within limits and subject to balancing from the other branches,
the center of the federal government.40 From Congress would
come all laws - the executive could only reject laws, unless over-
ruled,4" and the judiciary's sole power was that of interpreting
the law.4" Popular sovereignty meant that the branch of govern-
36. Note that the Bill of Rights passed immediately following the
Constitution's ratification.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. See DEKIEFFER, supra note 4. at 2.
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 15, at 57.
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 323 (James Madison) (Random House
1950).
41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
42. "The judiciary . . .has no influence over either the sword or the
purse. . . . It may truly be said to have neither force nor wilL but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even
for the efficacy of its judgments." THE FEDERALiST No. 78, at 504 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Random House 1950).
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ment most responsive to the will of the governed would perform
the government's primary functions.4"
C. Lobbying Groups Were Not Important to The Federalist
The role of lobbying groups in government appears some-
what unconsidered, in large part because the legislature itself was
to be the protector of rights. The right to petition was a post-
ratification addition to the Constitution. It shifted responsibility
for protecting rights from the legislature to the Constitution
itself (and eventually to the courts). It is possible that the early
writers were silent about lobbyists because they never considered
that a need would arise for them. Fifty years after the first Con-
gress met, however, Alexis de Tocqueville wondered at the Amer-
ican need to form associations and the resulting protection
against oppression and sedition:
In our own day freedom of association has become a neces-
sary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority.... [N]o
countries need associations more - to prevent either des-
potism of parties or the arbitrary rule of a prince - than
those with a democratic social state .... There are factions
in America, but no conspirators.44
Lobbying groups were enshrined in the First Amendment's pro-
tection of the right to petition and in the general American
desire to do so.45 Tocqueville's associations, the forerunners of
lobbying groups, served to petition the government publicly for
the interests which caused their formation. Such organizations
presumably would petition to make their positions known to the
Burkian legislature, which would weigh their viewpoints in light
of the public good. By preserving petition as participation in
government, the First Amendment allowed for minority view-
points while structurally avoiding the wrongs of factionalism.
The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a federal gov-
ernment much weaker than that which eventually developed.
They saw the power of governing to be centered at the state
level.4" Most issues of law were to be handled by the individual
43. Indeed, the Constitution's Framers intended this interpretation so
strictly as to require all bills which proposed raising revenue to originate in the
House of Representatives. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
44. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 192-93 (Random
House, 1953).
45. DEKIEFFER, supra note 4i at 2.
46.
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national
sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and
whatever powers might remain in them would be altogether
19941
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states.47 Furthermore, since states were to handle all matters
internal to themselves, those issues which finally did come before
the federal legislature would have national implications whose
constituent viewpoints would be substantially represented by the
personal experiences of individual legislators48 .
Lobbyists were not a concern for the Constitution's Framers
because under a republican government that espoused Burke
theory they would be unnecessary. When the First Amendment
established the right to petition, people lobbying the federal leg-
islature needed no such protection. Congress, by its very struc-
ture, should have been able to protect minority rights under a
realm of debate by thoughtful representatives.
II. THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF LOBBYISTS
What the Framers envisioned and what has happened are
two very different scenarios. Much has been written concerning
the expanding role of the federal government in American polit-
ical history. With the Industrial Revolution, the expansion of
interstate commerce and rail transportation, and the need to
counter post-reconstruction backlash in southern states, the fed-
eral government found its law-providing role expand. Adminis-
trative agencies performed much of this new federal work, and
dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims
only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and
which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.
TilE FEDERAt.liST No. 32, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Random House 1950).
47. l
48. Federalist 53 argues that the short term of members of the House
serves to keep representatives informed of the interests of the people they serve:
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright
intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the
subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be
acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of
men in private as well as public situations. Another part can only be
attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the
station which requires the use of it. The period of service, ought,
therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of
practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service.
THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 349-50 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
(Random House 1950). Note that this argument totally rejects mandatory term
limits as a means of protecting popular interests in the House. Note also that
the argument might allow for lobbyists to keep representatives informed of
their constituent's interests, although The Federalist probably never contem-
plated such a result.
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the role the federal government had in the economy gradually
shifted from that of enabler to that of manager.49
A. Expanding Federal Law Has Led to Increased Lobbying
With the rise of federal managerial control,5 groups evolved
to represent the industrial interests affected (i.e., chambers of
commerce, labor unions, etc.). By the 1950s, organized indus-
trial interests found themselves lobbying regularly in Washington
for their respective interests.5 Over time, the federal role in eve-
ryday life has grown, stemming from the vast array of federal pro-
grams established during the New Deal and continuing through
the Great Society.5" Traditional industrial lobbying groups have
become unable to represent to Congress the opinions of national
constituencies on all issues.53 A vast array of new interest groups,
focused on the much more specific and complex issues faced by
Congress, has arisen to lobby Congress for their constituents'
needs. 4
Congress continues to pass increasingly generalized statutes,
which have led to expanded federal law and a larger role for
administrative agencies. 55  Today, administrative agencies
enforce the legislature's intent by fleshing out the details of Con-
gressional policy.5 Because administrative agencies must follow
the general guidelines of their enabling legislation, parties inter-
ested in a particular issue have an increased incentive to lobby
Congress for protection of their interests at the policy-making
49. For a history and criticism of the development of administrative
agency power, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
50. The role of administrative agencies in regulating such industrial
practices as interstate commerce is virtually unquestioned. A long string of
cases dating to the late nineteenth century recognizes the managerial role of
administrative agencies. See, e.g., Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene. Cotton Oil
Co., 204 U.S. 425 (1906).
51. Judis, supra note 5, at 15.
52. See Id. at 17.
53. Id. at 16.
54. Id.
55. JEWELL & PATERSON, supra note 6, at 5.
56.
In the traditional division of power among the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government, the task of lawmaking belongs to
the legislature. Only in the most formal sense, however, is this a
realistic way of distinguishing the work of the legislature from that of
other parts of government. Administrative decisions, often formalized
and published as orders and rules, constitute another part of the law.
19941
612 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8
level.57 Thus the broadening scope of federal statutes has led to
an increase in organized interest groups who lobby to affect the
overall focus of legislation. 8 In sum, the increased complexity of
federal law and the rise of administrative agencies have precipi-
tated increased lobbying of the federal legislature.
The increase in specific programs to deal with complex
needs has caused a corresponding increase in groups interested
in individual issues.59 Large lobbying groups work for national
constituencies, but their methods are similar to those used by
smaller, more narrowly focused lobbying groups.60 To see how
influential these groups are, and what kinds of influence they
exert in the House or Representatives, one needs simply to look
at their methods of operation.
B. Today's Lobbyists Play Multiple Roles in the Political Process
1. Lobbyists Represent Constituent Groups
Contrary to popular opinion, lobbying groups generally do
not trade campaign funds for votes.6 Bribery and influence-ped-
dling are much more myth than reality in the current American
57. Congress passes laws that create and empower administrative agencies
to follow complex and specific policies. Agencies must look primarily to the
enabling legislation for a guide on how to bring about what Congress intended.
Agencies are limited further by their defined powers under the Fifth
Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). See
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 33 (1982); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1950). An administrative agency depends heavily on the scope and focus
Congress imputes through relevant statutes. Lobbying groups whose
constituents are affected by the agency's decisions have a significant interest in
molding legislation beneficial to their constituent's interests. Therefore,
lobbyists have an interest in affecting laws at the policy level.
58. Judis, supra note 5, at 17.
59. "Beginning in the late 1950s, new political movements emerged that
did not fit into the structure of the old Washington pressure groups and
political parties. They included on the one side the civil rights movement, the
antiwar movement, the women's movement, the environmental movement, the
movements for gay rights, consumer rights and abortion rights and on the
other side the new conservative movement, the movements against racial
desegregation and later against busing and affirmative action, the anti-abortion
movement, and the right-wing evangelical movements." Id.
60. In the second part of Lobbying Congress: How the System Works, Bruce C.
Wolpe performs case studies to demonstrate how both traditional lobbying
groups (i.e., industrial lobbies and unions dating to the early 1900s) such as the
U.S. League of Savings Institutions and modern focus groups like the Minimum
Wage Coalition to Save Jobs operate very similarly (depending on the
practicalities of a given situation) to influence Congressional actions. BRUCE C.
WOLPE, LOBBYING CONGRESS: How THE SYSTEM WoRKs 65-132 (1990).
61. SeeJEWELL & PATrERSON, supra note 6, at 291.
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political scene.62 Lobbying groups operate, as the numerous
training manuals on how to lobby suggest, openly and under
close scrutiny.63
The role of a lobbyist is to influence legislation as an active
representative of constituents.6 4 There are various specialties
within the field of lobbying. 65 The stereotypic lobbyist, known in
the industry as the contact person, maintains contact with legisla-
tors to remain a familiar face and recognized voice when a legis-
lator considers relevant legislation.66 Most of a contact person's
work is done not by glad-handing but rather by telephone and
letter contact.67 Communications via letter and telephone are
means to provide information to legislators.68 Contact people
maintain connections most strongly with legislators most open to
influence.69
Other forms of lobbying involve organizing grass-roots sup-
port for a particular legislative program, watching the legislative
calendar to keep constituents informed of important congres-
sional activities, developing a lobbying strategy, and, importantly,
making sure legislators are apprised of both relevant facts and a
group's opinion on major issues.7 °
62. Id. "Despite the myth that successful lobbying implies influence
peddling, most effective lobbyists trade in facts - not influence.... Your long-
term credibility is far more important than any temporary advantage you may
gain through prevarication." DEKIEFFER, supra note 4, at 203-204. But see
MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
129 (2d ed. 1989) ("None of the studies on the question of whether money buys
or follows votes can be considered definitive.").
63. WOLPE, supra note 60, at 3.
64. JEWELL & PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 287.
65. Id.
66. Contact people do not comprise a majority of lobbyists. In fact, while
PACs employ many lobbyists, only a small percentage are contact people. Id. at
288.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 290. Jewell and Patterson note that although lobbyists tend to
believe personal relationships with legislators are their most influential tools,
legislators themselves find the information lobbyists supply to be of the greatest
influence. Id. See also DEKIEFFER, supra note 4, at 18 ("[P]ersonal peccadilloes
do not have much affect on the Washington scene.").
69. "The contact man is likely to have his most persistent and regular
contacts with friendly legislators, those who share at least a considerable
proportion of the group's views.... [L]egislative leaders are much more likely
than rank-and-file members to be objects of contact work." JEWELL &
PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 288.
70. Id at 288-90.
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2. Lobbyists Build Coalitions
Lobbying activities mirror the coalition building of a legisla-
ture. Individual representatives find they have much better suc-
cess when working with others toward a common interest. When
a particular lobbying group hopes to enact or to oppose a piece
of legislation, it assembles a cadre of groups with similar interests
to increase their effect. 7  Synergy among lobbying groups
increases not only the resources available for a project but also
the claim of representation of popular interest.72 Once popular
support for (or against) a measure is organized, the lobbying sys-
tem operates symbiotically with the legislative system: key players
are contacted, information on the issues is shared, legislators are
polled for support, administrative agencies are contacted for sup-
port, testimony is given, and the legislative process runs its
course. The central role of lobbyists in this process is to enable
legislators to form opinions by offering information. 73
Lobbyists focus their attention on those most important to
their group's success.' 4 Because of the specialization of the
House in its committee system, lobbyists need only contact a
handful of representatives concerning passage of particular legis-
lation or administrative oversight. Thus lobbyists can concen-
trate their efforts rather than going to the expense of contacting
435 representatives. As will be noted in Section Three of this
article, the structural relationship that intimately connects lobby-
ists with specific representatives may lead to legislative capture.
3. Lobbyists Perform Grass Roots Organizing and Fund
Raising
Lobbyists use press and advertising campaigns and grass-
roots measures such as mass-mailing to muster support for their
viewpoint.75 A classic example of this method is the work on the
Cable Reform Act of 1992. Groups supporting the Cable Bill,
including the Association of Network Broadcasters and the Con-
71. DEKIEFFER, supra note 4, at 20.
72. Id.
73. See generally CHARLES S. MACK, LOBBYING AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS:
A GUIDE FOR EXECUTInES 83-89 (1989). See also WOLPE, supra note 60, at 9
("Lobbying is the political management of information."). Of course, an
effective lobbyist, like any good advocate, will characterize information to put
his or her viewpoint in the best light.
74. "In general, legislators react most favorable toward lobbyists in terms
of the measure of public sentiment and the information, research, and support
the lobbyist can provide, rather than in terms of pressures or assertions of
demands." JEWELL & PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 293. See also infra part II.B.iv.
75. DEKIEFFER, supra note 4, at 39.
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sumer Federation of America, aired many advertisements on net-
work television asking for mail-in campaigns in favor of the bill.76
At the same time, cable regulation opponents advertised warn-
ings (on cable channels) about the potential effects of the legisla-
tion.77 Regulation supporters succeeded in generating enough
popular support for the bill that it passed overwhelmingly,
becoming the only bill to overcome a veto during President
Bush's administration.78
The history of the Cable Reform Act illustrates another
aspect of lobbying, namely, campaign spending. Conventional
wisdom suggests that special interest groups and PACs spend
money on political campaigns so to ensure that a legislator will
favor them in the future.79 In fact, the converse is true. Lobby-
ing groups expend personal and financial resources to support
legislators who have shown them support in the past. Groups use
money to keep friendly voices in power, not to keep powerful
voices friendly.8" Money interrelates with access, not with vot-
ing."1 Indeed, many works describing the methods of lobbying
mention campaign contributions only briefly.8"
76. See Paul Farhi, Foes of Cable Bill Outspend Its Supporters; Opponents Gave
$1.2 Million to Lawmakers in 10 Months, 3 1/2 Times as Much as Backers, WAsH.
POST, Sept. 22, 1992, at DI.
77. Id.
78. Bush Vetoes Bill to Curb Rates for Basic Cable TV, L.A. TMES, Oct. 4, 1992,
at Al.
79. "It is quite conceivable that on a [close] vote some will suggest that
money made the difference, especially for any member who switches his or her
position [from a previous Senate vote]." Farhi, supra note 76, at Dl (quoting
James C. May, National Association of Broadcasters, regarding the effect
campaign spending had on the Cable Reform Act).
80. Wolpe distinguishes between legitimate (i.e., both ethical and
protected within the Constitution) and illegitimate means of lobbying:
Seeking a vote, arguing for a certain position, turning up the pressure
from constituents and other supporters of the legislator are all
legitimate [means of influencing a legislator]. Demanding a vote as a
price for continued or promised financial support is never legitimate
and is a corruption of the process .... A lawmaker may well have a
hope, if not an expectation, for political financial support at a
subsequent time, and the absence of such support may mean a cooler
relationship in the future. But that legislator simply cannot and will
not ignore a constituent or local interest confronting a bona fide
governmental issue.
WOLPE, supra note 60, at 46.
81. "What that less-than-charitable giving achieves in total is the subject of
controversy, but the minimum is surely access, provided of course that the
amount is noticeable." WOOTrON, supra note 9, at 200. But see WOLPE, supra
note 60, at 47 (suggesting that the most effective campaign contributions are
spent on those whose support a group already has).
82. See generally DEKIEFFER, supra note 4, at 144-48; WOLPE, supra note 60,
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4. Lobbyists Act in Symbiosis with Congress
Lobbying works not to control Congressional voting but
rather to complement the work of Congress. Lobbying groups
aid Congress by demonstrating the desires of the public and pri-
vate organizations8" whose goodwill substantially affects signifi-
cant portions of the public. Lobbyists share important
information with lawmakers. Lobbying groups act as secondary
access points to Congress, thereby increasing the amount of pub-
lic influence exerted in Washington.84 The effect of lobbying
should be positive, so long as lobbying activities are open and
above-board.
Also contrary to popular myth, lobbying groups generally
avoid using underhanded methods of influencing legislators,
mainly because such methods are highly ineffective. 5 Because
the two primary activities of a lobbying group are information-
sharing and generating popular support, credibility is of primary
importance for effective lobbying.86 If a group loses its credibil-
ity by misstating facts or by using unethical methods of influence,
legislators will mistrust that group's influence and popular sup-
port will evaporate.87
Lobbyists survive in Washington not on the power of the
money they spend, nor on the connections they maintain,
because individual Congressional representatives are too
independent from lobbyists to allow them to hold too much
at 43-47. Both describe, in detail, the work performed by lobbying groups.
Campaign contributions make up only a minor chapter in each book.
83. Examples of such organizations are professional groups, labor
unions, and major industrial entities.
84. Analysts disagree, however, over whether lobbying groups offer a
balance of viewpoints: "Because interest groups and their lobbyists generally
play adversarial roles on particular issues, they tend to act as a rein on each
other, preventing any single interest from getting too powerful for too long."
MACK, supra note 73, at 8. Mack also argues that the relative power of lobbying
groups is controlled by the amount of support each group can muster over a
long period of time: "Cycles in public opinion, working through the political
process ... keep interest group alliances of either the left or the right from
gaining permanent ascendancy." Id. But see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTrE ACTION 125-31 (1965) (arguing that it is structurally impossible for
large and small groups to have equivalent influence when lobbying).
85. RONALD J. HREBENAR & RUTH K. SCOTT, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN
AMERICA 91 (2d ed. 1990). The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C.
§ 261 (1988), registers and strictly regulates all lobbying activities in a way
similar to the way the Freedom of Information Act and sunshine laws open the
regulatory decision-making process to the scrutiny of a skeptical public eye.
DEKIEFFER, supra note 4, at 6.
86. WOLPE, supra note 60, at 9.
87. DEKIEFFER, supra note 4, at 203-204.
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power.88 Lobbyists succeed by demonstrating the importance of
the viewpoints they represent and the measure of support that
exists for their positions. PACs and other quasi-public groups
maintain a counterbalancing view against powerful public-inter-
est lobbies and other opposing interests, and vice versa. This
multiple presentation of interests empowers Congressional rep-
resentatives to make better-informed decisions. Thus, lobbying
generally aids Congressional decision-making rather than hin-
dering it. If lobbying groups ever effectively counter public
demand and thereby capture Congressional policy, they succeed
by taking advantage of a Congressional system that places power
in the hands of only a few representatives. Lobbyists do not
maintain the stranglehold that most people think they have on
Congress. The hands around the Congressional neck are its own.
III. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATORS
Popular conception portrays lobbyists as using undue influ-
ence to obtain the passage of laws favorable to their desires. The
House of Representatives passes and defeats laws in a manner
which allows for interest group influence, but which also places
more importance on factors other than lobbying and much less
conducive to popular sovereignty. The committee structure of
the House, coupled with its seniority system and the inherent
advantages of incumbency, forges ruts in the legislative process
whereby powerful incumbents can bend laws to their designs
irrespective of the popular will or the public good.89
A. The Congressional Role Has Shifted from Legislation to Oversight
Recalling the Framers' belief that the power of the central
government would be weak, one recognizes that problems dealt
with by the federal legislature today are much more numerous
and complex than those faced by early legislatures." In order to
cope with the increasing numbers and abstractness of laws, the
federal government formed an administrative process within the
executive branch to manage developing issues instead of legislat-
88. "Legislators most cherish their independence and the perception that
they are independent. The ability of a lawmaker to exercise independence
from outside interests is the difference between influence and control."
WOLPE, supra note 60, at 46.
89. On the power of a committee chairperson to affect a bill, see WALTER
J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 93-97 (3d ed.
1989). See also FIORINA, supra note 62, at 17-29, 48-52.
90. STONE, supra note 13, at 175; see also supra text accompanying notes
49-60.
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ing solutions to problems one-at-a-time.9' The shift in emphasis
from legislation to oversight has caused a re-focusing of power
within the House to the committee chairs.92 Matters which
would normally be dealt with by the Committee of the Whole
have been shifted to standing and special committees and sub-
committees.93 Increasing complexity of issues has led to an
increasing diversification and decentralization of the House com-
mittee structure. All work on bills happens in committees, with
the ultimate approval of the powerful House Rules Committee.94
The committee system of the House breaks down into
roughly three types of committees. Authorization committees,
which are responsible for implementing Congressional policy,
debate most policy-oriented bills. Oversight committees super-
vise administrative agencies' actions pursuant to statutory author-
ization. Appropriations committees determine how much
money agencies may spend in following their mandate.
1. Authorization Committees Decide on Policy
Most of the debate on how to enact Congressional policy
occurs in authorization committees, which ultimately decide the
fate of all policy-oriented legislation. Senior committee mem-
bers have particularly strong voices, ostensibly because their spe-
cialized experience with committee matters grants them a
wisdom and knowledge of relevant issues."
91. ChiefJustice Rehnquist has traced the history of administrative law to
the desire for expertise within federal administration:
The many later decisions that have upheld congressional delegations
of authority to the Executive Branch have done so largely on the
theory that Congress may wish to exercise its authority in a particular
field, but because the field is sufficiently technical, the ground to be
covered sufficiently large, and the Members of Congress themselves
not necessarily expert in the area in which they choose to legislate, the
most that may be asked under the separation-of-powers doctrine is
that Congress lay down the general policy and standards that animate
the law, leaving the agency to refine those standards....
Industrial Dep't, ALF-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
92. WOOTTON, supra note 9, at 59.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 60.
95. The chairman is deemed the most senior member of a committee's
majority: "The chairman usually has had a long period of service on the
committee and is likely to be better informed than most other members on the
myriad of issues coming before the committee. The chairman often is privy to
the leadership's plans and policies." OLESZEK, supra note 89, at 93. By
leadership, Oleszek means the most senior members of the majority party.
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When an amended bill passes the authorization committee,
the Rules Committee schedules it for floor debate and ultimately
a vote. By the time the bill reaches the floor, the bill is nearly
assured passage by the majority because of deference to the com-
mittee's specialized opinion on the matters with which it deals.96
The roles of senior House committee members are of primary
importance to pending legislation. Complexity of issues lends to
the efficiency of sending bills before standing and special com-
mittees for consideration before a floor decision.97
2. Oversight and Appropriations Committees Verify Policy
The relationship between administrative agencies and the
authority granted them by enabling legislation further requires
the use of oversight committees and subcommittees. While an
authorization committee determines the public policy goals of
the agency, the oversight committee supervises agencies to assure
that they follow their mandate. Thus, if a conflict of ideology
arises between authorization and oversight committee members,
agencies get confusing signals as to how to apply the law. This
process is further complicated by the separate existence of
appropriations committees, which allocate spending according
to their members' ideological goals. In a system created to maxi-
mize efficiency, this split creates confusion of Congressional pol-
icy and its application.
B. Complexity Has Bred Specialization
Bills pass a committee only on an approval of the majority of
the committee's members. Because bills today are so complex,
committee members must develop expertise in the areas the
committee covers.98 Overseeing administrative agencies requires
similar specialization. While it allows for more efficient channel-
ing of bills through the House,9 9 specialization decreases debate
and position-taking by representatives on the floor by removing
96. STONE, supra note 13, at 178.
97. WooTroN, supra note 9, at 59.
98. "Specialization is necessary because the policy questions before
Congress not only cover a wide range but are extremely complex. Members
must spend a great deal of time learning the details of their specialty, much as
college professors must devote their lives to mastering a relatively small portion
of what is known." STONE, supra note 13, at 175.
99. Id. at 181 ("As slow as Congress can sometimes be, the committee
system greatly enhances its ability to act.").
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most debate to the committee room. This method of problem
management is contrary to the Framers' intentions.100
By the time a bill reaches a committee vote, it has been thor-
oughly researched and revised by the committee, the relevant
subcommittee, or both. The committee's relatively expert mem-
bers reach a consensus on the bill by evaluating the research and
recommendations of other experts, mainly lobbyists and affected
private concerns. At this level of lawmaking lobbyists are their
most influential."' 1 The type of influence lobbyists have at this
stage, as noted above, is mainly informational. Information sup-
plied by lobbying groups, whether on the potential impact of
proposed legislation or on the scope of popular support for an
issue, serves mainly to supplement the committee members'
expertise on issues.'
Once the committee has voted on a measure, any attempt
lobbying groups might make to controvert the bill's passage will
likely fail in face of floor approval of the vast majority of commit-
tee decisions.)° Consequently, the influence lobbying groups
might play in legislation is functionally limited to relevant com-
mittees. Within committees, lobbyist influence is subject to the
discretion of the committee seniority.104
C. Specialization Requires Incumbency
Since the committee structure of the House of Representa-
tives controls the passage of laws, individual representatives find
their hopes of influencing public policy tied to their committee
assignments. Representatives gravitate to particular committees
100. "Mechanisms that reduce conflict in Congress must be viewed with
great suspicion from the perspective of the Republic. Conflict was to be the
means by which tyranny was avoided because self-interest would frustrate self-
interest. Yet the committee system isolates decision makers in a complex
process. Bargains are struck among the most intensely concerned interests,
without regard for the interests not included." Id at 181-82. See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 15, at 80.
101. See STONE, supra note 13, at 182; see alsojEWELL & PATTERSON, supra
note 6, at 293-99.
102. ALLAN J. CIGLER & BURDETr A. LOOMIs, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS
264 (3d ed. 1991).
103. STONE, supra note 13, at 178. Because of the immense workload in
the House, representatives tend to rely on the committee system. They approve
nearly every measure that makes it out of committees. Note that this
unchecked committee power means that only a handful of representatives
make individual legislative decisions. Thus committees quash popular debate.
104. Lobbyists and the media generally make committee members aware
of the major viewpoints on most issues before them. Committee seniority can
control the flow of public information from non-organized sources by
manipulating scheduled hearings. OLESZEK, supra note 89, at 97-98.
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mainly for two reasons: to follow individual ideological goals and
to promote issues which are important to their constituencies.
1 0 5
Both forms of representation are incumbency-enhancing,
because both enable representatives to show constituents what
representatives have done to promote local interests in Con-
gress. °6 By espousing ideological viewpoints pleasing to constit-
uents, representatives develop a level of recognition with
constituent desires. Representatives assure their reelection by
pleasing constituents' locally-oriented desires through the use of
their seats on committees to promote local interests (for exam-
ple, using influence on the House Armed Services Committee to
make sure Congress does not close a local military base).
Hierarchy within committees determines the amount of
influence a particular legislator has over legislation.' 0 7 There-
fore, if a legislator wants to affect national policy on issues, he or
she must stay employed long enough to obtain seniority within
the committee. This goal of reelection contradicts the Framer's
intended goal of serving the public good. Rather than using
their judgment to vote on issues and accordingly serve the
nation's good, representatives attempt to gain reelection so they
can attain the seniority required to affect national policy.
If reelection were tied to thoughtful performance as a legis-
lator, then incumbency would mean (just as the Framers
intended) popular trust of a legislator's judgment. However,
incumbency is more often tied to service of local interests.1 0 8
The conflict of wills envisioned by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion is supplanted by a desire to stay in power long enough to
control management. The Framers envisioned popular sover-
eignty in the model of republican representation. Under current
seniority within committees, this popular sovereignty gets lost in
a system keyed on expertise developed over lengthy careers on
specific committees. The benefits of efficiency and expertise
offered by seniority and the committee system may seem over-
whelming, but it is this structure which most directly leads to a
stagnation of legislation and of incumbency in the House. 10 9
105. STONE, supra note 13, at 178.
106. Id.
107. "[C]ommittee chairs (and to a lesser degree subcommittee chairs)
wield significant influence over legislative outcomes. Their positions are
coveted by other members . . . ." Id. at 180.
108. STONE, supra note 13, at 160.
109.
Chairmen can ... delay, expedite, or modify legislation. A chairman
who opposes a bill may simply refuse to schedule hearings on it until it
is too late to finish action on the bill during the session. The same
result can be achieved by allowing the hearings to drag on
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Once elected, representatives find not only that reelection is
important for effectuating policy, but also that achieving reelec-
tion is relatively easy."' In addition to obtaining committee
assignments geared toward constituent interests, representatives
develop contact with their constituents through the numerous
services their offices provide. Complex Congressional staffs reply
to nearly all constituent needs, and representatives use the frank-
ing privilege to maintain contact with their constituents. These
privileges allow incumbents to maintain constituent satisfaction
at levels sufficient virtually to assure reelection.11'
The Framers of the Constitution envisioned debate among
representatives who used their judgment for the popular good
and who took personal responsibility for their choices. The
Framers hoped this system would effect national policy which
avoided exploitation of minorities and closely reflected the
national will. Complexity of issues and sheer numbers have
driven representation away from debate to a model of expert
decision-making and conformity to opinions formed within com-
mittees.' 12 The public good succumbs to the stale expertness
and hierarchical power of committee decisions. The hierarchical
structure of the committee system in the House stagnates Con-
gressional policy.
IV. LIMITING LOBBYING WILL Do NOTHING
As noted above, popular opinion has it that the role lobby-
ists play in Congressional politics is unacceptable. At first glance,
there appear to be two ways for Congress to respond to popular
opinion: Congress can either enact measures to curb lobbying
activities, or reform its internal structures that make lobbying
overly-influential. Rather than reform itself, Congress has begun
to look at changing the way in which lobbyists conduct their
activities. 1 '
interminably.... And through his control of funds and the power to
hire and fire most committee staffers, the chairman can effectively
block action on a bill by directing the staff to disregard it. A chairman
who favors a bill can give it top priority.
OLESZEK, supra note 89, at 93-94.
110. See FIORiNA, supra note 62, at 48-52.
111. STONE, supra note 13, at 164.
112. STONE, supra note 13, at 175.
113. While this article has until now focused solely on the House of
Representatives, the analysis of lobbying reform proposals must extend to the
entire Congress, because the reforms propose to affect all of Congress.
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In 1993, representatives in the House proposed at least
seven notable bills regarding lobbying."14 The Senate saw similar
legislation, and even passed a bill that would require stricter dis-
closure of lobbying activities.' 5 This section of this article will
unfold the different reform proposals, focusing primarily on S.
349 and H.R. 823, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993.
A. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993
A major obstacle to any lobbying legislation is Buckley v.
Valeo."' 6 In Buckley, the United States Supreme Court overturned
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which had
attempted to limit the amount of money any one person or
organization could donate to an electoral campaign. The
Supreme Court reasoned that such a limitation violated free
speech and free association. The plurality in Buckley felt that any
limitation on the amount of one's contribution amounts to a lim-
itation on the amount of one's speech. Because the First Amend-
ment protects all political speech, the plurality determined that
such limitations on speech are invalid.
Under this Constitutional rubric, Senator Carl Levin (D.,
MI) proposed the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993. Because
Buckley prohibits any limitation on the amount of political activity
in which a person might engage, the best reform Senator Levin
could offer is strict disclosure of all lobbying activities. The bill
proposes to supersede the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of
1946.117 It would require anyone who performs lobbying activi-
ties which incur semi-annual expenses exceeding $1,000, or who
receive $1,000 or more in income from lobbying activities, to reg-
ister with the Office of Lobbying Registration and Public Disclo-
sure (OLRAPD). 1 Twice per year, each lobbyist covered by the
act would have to disclose to the OLRAPD all lobbying activities
and finances related thereto.119 Additionally, any lobbyist who
approaches a member of Congress would have to, upon request,
114. This article will focus on the following House bills, none of which
has yet passed: H.R. 211, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993); H.R. 823, 103d Cong.,
1st. Sess. (1993); H.R. 1593, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993); H.R. 2267, 103rd
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993); H.R. 2834, 103rd Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993); H.R. 2864,
103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993); and H.R. 3357, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993).
115. The Senate considered S. 3. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), and S. 44,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), and passed S. 349, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
H.R. 823 is the House equivalent of S. 349.
116. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
117. 2 U.S.C. § 261 (1988). See supra text accompanying note 85. The
bill is S. 349, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1993).
118. S. 349, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1993).
119. 1& at§5.
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disclose the person or group whom the lobbyist represents.
20
Finally, S. 349 expresses a policy choice121 that limits should be
placed on acceptance of gifts and perks by members of
Congress. 122
The changes between S. 349 and the old Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act are not substantial. The current statute already
requires lobbying groups to register with the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House, 23 and provides penalties for
noncompliance with the law's registration requirements.1 24 The
1993 bill moves the registration office to a subdivision of the Jus-
tice Department,1 25 with an eye toward strict enforcement, but
the Senate has offered no indication that enforcement has been
lax in the past. S. 349 appears to include more people within the
definition of lobbyist than does the current statute, but it is
unclear as to what effect this change might have on lobbying.
26
On the other hand, agency disclosure is new in S. 349,
although, as noted above, lobbyists already have an incentive to
disclose those for whom they work.127 Also, the reporting
requirements in S. 349 are somewhat broader than in the current
statute.' 28 The most significant change between S. 349 and the
current statute is the stated policy on limiting gifts to members of
Congress. 29 In this regard, however, S. 349 merely states a
future intention. In passing S. 349, the Senate failed to enact
that intention. Thus the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993 offers
little change from the 1946 statute.
120. Id. at § 4.
121. This is for OLRAPD to enact. Note that this is precisely the
delegation of authority discussed in supra part III.A.
122. S. 349, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 21-22 (1993).
123. 2 U.S.C. § 267 (1988).
124. Id. at § 269.
125. S. 349, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §6 (1993).
126. Note that the Senate could broaden the scope of the lobbying law's
coverage only by including more casual lobbyists. Those whose business it is to
lobby already must register and follow all disclosure requirements. This
broader coverage might discourage average citizens from petitioning the
government. Indeed, S. 349 is forced to exclude from its definition those who
make little or no profit at lobbying (including those who regularly write their
Congressman), for fear of violating the First Amendment.
127. See supra part II.B.iv.
128. S. 349, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1993).
129. "It is the sense of the Senate that, as soon as possible during this
year's session, the Senate should limit the acceptance of gifts. meals and travel
by Members and staff in a manner substantially similar to the restrictions
applicable to executive branch officials." S. 349, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 21
(1993).
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B. Other Attempts at Lobby Reform
Other measures the Senate considered in 1993 include S. 3,
the Congressional Spending Limit and Election Reform Act.
One provision of this measure would prohibit lobbyists from
making contributions to the reelection campaigns of members of
Congress within a year of lobbying that member. It seems highly
doubtful that this measure would pass the Buckley test. The other
important Senate measure is S. 44, proposed by Senator Strom
Thurmond (R., SC). S. 44 would prohibit lobbyists from being
paid on a contingent fee basis. This might serve as a disincentive
for ardent lobbying, and could be an interesting reform, if it
applies to anyone. S. 44 has not yet left the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
The House saw a number of proposals in 1993. One propo-
sal sought to broaden the definition of bribery under federal law
to include all payments to members of Congress made by lobby-
ists. Other reforms proposed in the House focus on mainly two
topics: limiting the perks a member of Congress may receive
from lobbyists, and lengthening the period during which a for-
mer government employee is prohibited from lobbying
Congress.
H.R. 211 proposes to treat as bribery any payment by a lob-
byist to or on behalf of a member of Congress. This measure is
incredibly broad in scope. Among other effects, it would pro-
hibit schools that testify regularly before Congress from offering
any honoraria to a member of Congress1 30 . This measure would
apply to all who qualify as lobbyists, which, under S. 349, would
include virtually anyone who testifies before Congress regularly.
As noted above, studies indicate that bribery is not the method of
operation for lobbying groups.' 3 1 Broadening the scope of brib-
ery would only add to the definition of bribery those payments
which simply are not bribery.
The reforms- dealing with gifts from lobbying groups appear
to have some merit. While they cannot limit the amount of cam-
paign contributions or the number of perks offered by a lobby-
ing group under Buckley, these measures can limit the number of
perks received by members of Congress. The Sunshine for Lob-
byists Act of 1993, H.R. 2834, would require lobbyists to make
130. Including honoraria for speaking about, say, lobby reform. Note
that only those schools which testify regularly, and. thus would be considered
lobbyists under S. 349, would be prohibited from offering honoraria. The
University of Notre Dame would be unable to have Representative Tim Roemer
(D-IN) speak on its campus, but South Bend Central High School could.
131. See supra part II.B.i.
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semi-annual reports to the Attorney General regarding any bene-
fits they conferred on individual members of Congress. The
Information on Financial Benefits Act of 1993, H.R. 2864, is sub-
stantially the same, although it allows for disclosure in the regu-
lar semi-annual lobbying statement. S. 349 contains provisions
somewhat similar to these proposals. 32
H.R. 3357 renews a proposed reform which would prohibit
all travel by a member of Congress at the expense of a lobbying
group. Similar proposed reforms have included limitations on
the dollar amount of dinners and gifts a member of Congress or
Congressional staff-member may receive from lobbyists. These
proposals associate gifts by lobbyists with underhanded influ-
ence-peddling. While the studies listed above, particularly the
Jewell and Patterson study, dispute such an implication, these
proposals might be useful for appearance's sake. Limiting the
amount of gifts a member of Congress may receive might affect a
marginal representative's activities. More importantly, however,
these reforms would offer the public the assurance that lobbying
is done completely above-board.
Note that the gift-limiting reforms focus not on lobbyists,
but rather on members of Congress themselves. This article has
argued that lobbying groups generally aid Congress. Where lob-
bying groups might offer undue influence is precisely where the
Congressional system and individual members of Congress might
let them. By focusing reform on those most responsible for the
problems of Congressional stagnation, these reforms have some
merit. It is important to note that these reforms have met stiff
opposition in the House.
133
Finally, H.R. 1593 and H.R. 2267 propose to eliminate the
undue use of influence by former government employees. These
proposed reforms follow the belief that formerly tied-in govern-
ment employees can use their connections to give clients a leg up
with members of Congress. H.R. 1593 would require former gov-
ernment employees to disclose all contacts they have with cur-
rent government officials for five years after they leave the
government. H.R. 2267 would prohibit all former members of
Congress from engaging in lobbying activities for five years after
they leave Congress. Unfortunately, these and similar proposals
132. S. 349, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(c)(3) (1993).
133. See Lobby Reform Slows Down As House Balks At New Limits, CHRIsrIAN
ScI. MONITOR, Oct. 26, 1993, at 2. H.R. 3357 was introduced after this
newspaper article was printed.
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miss the fundamental premise of modern lobbying: it's not
whom you know, it's what you know.
13 4
It appears obvious that the most Congress can do to reform
lobbying is adjust current law at the margins. Laws restricting the
amount of lobbying activities are unconstitutional. Laws increas-
ing the amount of disclosure a lobbying group must offer border
on the superfluous. The only reform proposals that might affect
the amount of influence lobbyists have in the House, while not
harming the positive aspects of lobbying, are those that focus on
representatives themselves. Unwilling to face such a change,
Congress will probably continue to wring its hands over lobby
reform. Policy stagnation in the House will not end until House
structures are reformed.
V. CONCLUSION: REFORM MUST COME FROM WITHIN
Everyone hates lobbyists in general but loves those who
advocate their views. In a similar light, everyone hates Congress,
and loves their own representative. The reality of lobbying is not
that special interests stagnate the work of the Congress. Rather,
lobbyists represent public interests and major industrial and eco-
nomic interests to representatives too unwilling to look beyond
the demands of their most vocal constituents. What causes stag-
nation is a system which perpetuates control centers among the
most senior members of the House while it attempts to cope with
its burgeoning workload. Conflicts of ideology are played out
not in the realm of floor debate, but rather in the forum of three
separate committees for each major piece of legislation.
The Framers of the Constitution probably never envisioned
a House of Representatives so given to incumbency and seniority,
and to the benefits of being a Congressman. The committee
structure of the House of Representatives places too much
importance on seniority for efficiency in the management of leg-
islative policy. The power of incumbents and senior members
leads to a feudalistic legislature wherein many of the most impor-
tant decisions concerning the public will are made by a handful
of senior representatives.
Specialists gain power. To keep power, they must maintain
focus on issues, even dead issues, which provide their power.
134. A recent trilogy of New York Times articles focuses on modern
lobbying tactics. The last article in the trilogy quotes Jan Schoonmaker, a
recent Congressional staff-member and current lobbyist: "'Information is the
currency of Capitol Hill,' he says, 'not dollars. And not friends.'" Michael
Wines, A New Maxim for Lobbyists: What You Know, Not Whom, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3,
1993, at Al.
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Additionally, the trade of votes for incumbency and eventually
power means that younger representatives have to play a reelec-
tion game (which many seem to do very well) until they have
enough seniority to be among the select few who have power in
the House. The solution to this problem lies to a great extent in
people trusting in their representatives, and in representatives
being willing to use their judgment on issues and taking responsi-
bility for unpopular stances in lieu of relying on the most popu-
lar of different constituent interests. Popular representation
requires representatives to be willing to espouse unpopular
viewpoints.
If the House is to be the republican body the Framers envi-
sioned, Congress must find a way to counter the unchecked
power of committees and their hierarchy, to return debate to
levels which are designed to discern the common good. The
complexities of the House committee structure have undoubt-
edly been the subject of many doctoral theses, as have ways to
reform that structure. This article will offer only points of focus
that the author believes to be necessary for effectual reform.
First, and most importantly, representatives must learn to
trust their own judgment. To get reelected and gain power, rep-
resentatives focus too much on popular local concerns of their
constituents. In so doing, they betray their judgment for exper-
tise and seniority. They deny their constituents what the Framers
considered to be the most important part of representation,
namely, the best use of their individual judgment on all issues.
To return to republican popular sovereignty as the Framers saw
it, representatives must focus once more on deciding issues wisely
rather than in a politically expedient fashion. They must run the
risk of losing incumbency to preserve their integrity as wise
(Madison would say patriotic) representatives.
Furthermore, if debate is to replace seniority dominance,
then debate must be available to all members of Congress, not
just to those involved in relevant committees. This point of focus
must not be mistaken for a proposal to abandon the committee
structure altogether. Abandoning committees would cause more
stagnation than it would relieve; if every representative had to
deal with every bill, nothing would get done. Rather, committees
must become more responsive to the Committee of the Whole in
a way that enables representatives to exert influence over meas-
ures that come from committees other than their own.
Finally, the Rules Committee must decrease the powers of
committee chairpeople, especially the power to set agenda within
the committee and the power to determine staff assignments.
These powers should be shared democratically among the com-
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mittee members.. Shared power necessarily means losing the
expedience of having one person handle seeming incidentals.
Nonetheless, problems arising from this lost inconvenience
would be far outweighed both by avoiding abuse of chairperson
power and by letting more players determine the focus a commit-
tee will have on any given issue.
Other procedures could fine tune the process of committee
and floor consideration. The problem of slow passage of non-
expedited legislation may find a solution in making more uni-
form the procedures to be followed by every committee. Making
procedures uniform would also remove some of the inherent
experiential advantages of seniority within committees. Clarify-
ing the process required for legislation rather than leaving it to
the discretion of committee chairs would result in faster prepara-
tion of legislation. 35
What is lost in the procedural expertise of the House senior-
ity is adequately made up for by the decreasing importance of
incumbency and the increased role junior members may play in
the formation of laws and the greater emphasis on the value of
wise judgment and good debate. When legislators decide that
they care more about the public good than about their own
reelection, the role of lobbying will become strictly informa-
tional. Only then the House can proceed, through debate and
good judgment, to enact the public mandate.
135. This would occur probably with equally-informed results, because,
in general, legislators already know most of the ins and outs of opinion and
expert knowledge on major legislation before it gets to the committee. See
supra note 104. Minor legislation usually comes from committee, so it would
receive committee scrutiny throughout its life.
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